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The subject matter of the research is as follows: pension reforms conducted by some states define the 
transformation of pension systems. The choice of countries is stipulated by the fact that each of them has dif-
ferent types of pension systems and preconditions for reforms. The purpose is to develop an approach that 
allows comparing and evaluating changes in disparate systems. The hypothesis is that the ongoing pension 
reforms, regardless of initial conditions and their type lead to a similar trajectory of pension systems devel-
opment in all countries. The methodology rests on the comparative analysis that was carried out on the ba-
sis of a single algorithm that allows to determine significant modifiable parameters and the overall direction 
of reform. The novelty is that the authors research the ongoing pension reform from the viewpoint of pen-
sion rights formation and distribution of risks. The results are a single trajectory of reforms implementation 
for the studied countries, which confirms the authors’ hypothesis. The specific features of the Russian pen-
sion system do not affect the reform trajectory, which is similar to all countries. The conclusions are the  fol-
lowing: the reducing pressure on pension system requires increasing revenues and limiting the number of po-
tential participants. This is achieved by expanding sources of financing, increasing the dependence of pen-
sion on an employee’s contributions, transferring the risks of old age into the individual level, and employ-
ment motivation during the retirement period. The principle of the intergenerational solidarity loses its value. 
The obtained results can be used for the pension reform modification in the Russian Federation, the develop-
ment of voluntary pension insurance based on the experience of other countries and risks faced by the mod-
ern Russian pension system.
Keywords: pension reform, scenarios of pension reforms, pension system, pay-as-you-go system, defined benefit, 
defined contribution, poverty protection, income replacement, pension rights, risks, pension schemes
Introduction
Many governments have been actively reform-
ing their national old age protection systems, re-
cently. Depending on a selected scenario, there 
could be defined the following types of the re-
forms: 1) modification requirements to a per-
son for future pension amount without changing 
structure of the pension; 2) a shift from pay-as-
you-go to funded schemes with focus on modern-
izing the proportion between the structural parts 
of pension payments (Latvia, Sweden, Poland, 
France, Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan); 3) a transition 
to fully funded system (Bolivia, Mexico, Chile, 
Salvador and Kazakhstan); 4) mixed reforms inte-
grating all three above mentioned types (the UK, 
Italy, Germany, Russia). 
The current form of pension system (pay-as-
you-go, funded, notion-defined contribution), the 
social and retirement legislation, the national fi-
nancial market development and the reform goals 
determine the choice of a reforming path. We can 
1 © Belozyorov S. A., Pisarenko Zh. V. Text. 2015.
underline the basic aims of the current pension 
reforms: 
1. The setting-up of economic and socially sus-
tainable pension system.
2. The elaboration of the flexible mechanism 
adapted to the individual needs of participants 
(the period of transition from employment to 
retirement).
3. The motivation to continue employment 
during the retirement period.
4. Equitable resources division and gender 
equality. 
5. The development of the system based on 
simple and understandable rules for low educated 
users.
6. The availability and transparency of the in-
formation about the system operation. 
The difficulty is a selection of a transition sce-
nario: it depends on a reform type. As the popu-
lation is convinced that to maintain an adequate 
level of living for retirees is a natural obligation 
of the government, and all changes are perceived 
ambiguously [1]. 
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The purpose of the article is to formulate an 
approach for comparison and assessing the cur-
rent pension reforms in the initially disparate sys-
tems on the common criteria. That will help to put 
forward suggestions for future improvement of 
the RF pension system.
The recent pension reforms are of research’s 
much attention. For example, Axel H. Börsch-
Supan [2] gives an overview of European reforms 
with a special attention to particular elements in 
the context of the world economic crisis. Edgar 
Vogel, Alexander Ludwig analyze pension reforms 
from the position of stochastic overlapped gener-
ation model [3].
The international organizations such as 
OECD, the World Bank, the International Labour 
Organization provide peer reviews of pension re-
forms. Under the auspices of them, annual re-
views of pension and insurance markets, pension 
systems reforms in the world are published. The 
Russian authors also conduct in-depth analyses of 
the recent pension reform in Russia [4–8] but ex-
isting analytical frameworks do not seem to pro-
vide a full picture, as they are rather fragmentary.
Theoretical frameworks 
From the focus of redistribution, the state 
pension policy is a dynamic system that trans-
fers a part of individual’s income during the life 
cycle and manages the risk of poverty in old age. 
Formation of pension rights is initially based on 
the citizenship. Thereafter, individual contribu-
tions to the system, employment period, and etc. 
are counted. At the payout stage, accumulated 
pension rights are distributed.
The authors distinguish the following types of 
pension rights formation:
1. Supporting — based on the current income 
and the subsistence minimum. It is assumed that 
an individual’s income is below the statutory level. 
The supporting type performs the function of the 
State on poor prevention. 
2. Proportional — based on the fixed per-
centage from a previous wage (lost income). 
Calculations of pension entitlements are deter-
mined proportionally to the wage during a specific 
period. There is a probability that the chosen pe-
riod would not be the most favorable for an indi-
vidual income that will result in reducing the ba-
sis for calculating the future pension benefits.
3. Tunnel — based on a stipulated minimum 
and maximum wage and the length of a contri-
bution period to the system. The tunnel type sug-
gests the linkage between contributions and sub-
sequent pension benefits of participants. There is 
a possibility to earn pension entitlements within 
a minimum and maximum statutory limit, but the 
maximization of pension rights for a future retiree 
is restricted.
4. Equivalent — based on contributions to the 
system and life expectancy (‘Defined Contribution’ 
and ‘Notion Defined Contribution’ pension plans 
are close to this type). The equivalent type sug-
gests the link between contributions and pension 
benefits for each worker without any restrictions 
on pension entitlements. As a result, the present 
value of expected lifetime contributions must be 
equal to the present value of expected lifetime 
benefits, which corresponds to both the principles 
of financial equivalence and actuarial principles. 
Worldwide pension-reforming processes ex-
actly aim to develop the models with individually 
dependent contributions and benefits. The vari-
ation of the equivalent type is Notional Defined 
Contribution (NDC) plan that combines elements 
of funded (DС) and unfunded (pay-as-you-go fi-
nancing) plans. The pioneers in developing 
NDC schemes were Sweden, Poland and Latvia. 
Germany joined later but achieved good results [9; 
10].
In NDC plans, worker’s pension benefits are 
calculated on the aggregated individual basis re-
valued at a current rate of return, which is spec-
ified by either the GDP growth rate, wage growth 
or the combination of both. We should note that 
unlike the traditional funded plans, the accumu-
lated funds are not invested but indexed on a cho-
sen parameter (mostly with the reference to the 
wage growth, in percentage).
“Old age” risk management. The modern pen-
sion provision systems were developing through-
out the twentieth century and were the essential 
element of the public management of social risk. 
Owing to the market failures management of old 
age risk was transferred from the individual level 
to the public one [11]. The logic of negative ex-
ternalities justified the interference into privacy, 
and the emergence of pension arrangement insti-
tute based on the principles of risk pooling and 
inter-generation solidarity was an appropriate 
method of managing old age risk. The state pen-
sion system was aimed at managing, organizing 
and redistribution of resources between genera-
tions for reducing individual risk of old age pov-
erty [12]: on one side, to provide a statutory re-
tiree subsistence minimum above the threshold 
of poverty, on the other side, to maintain an ac-
ceptable living standard. There are several origins 
of the decline in the living standards during the 
retirement period for an individual. The first one 
is making impropriate decisions as well as over-
estimating his or her possibilities. Some people 
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are not able to plan sufficient retirement savings 
due to the lack of funding; others prefer current 
consumption to the long-term savings. The sec-
ond reason is external political, macroeconomic, 
demographic and other shocks, which could influ-
ence the safety of savings. All above-mentioned 
ones have generated the necessity for the pension 
schemes development with the mandatory par-
ticipation of working population (in other words, 
taxpayers). Those patterns provided poverty risk 
distribution among the entire working population 
and guaranteed pension provision at least at the 
subsistent minimum of a retiree. However, in the 
late twentieth century a changing environment 
had been provoked by demographic problems in 
pension systems based on intergenerational sol-
idarity. In addition, there were threats of manip-
ulation with “social” funds for political purposes. 
[12].
The transferring of old age risk into the indi-
vidual level reduces the probability of political 
risks and demographic problems but increases the 
risk of employment. Low salary, interruptions in 
working history and informal employment do not 
let a worker accumulate sufficient pension rights 
and diminish welfare at an elderly age. Crisis pe-
riods in economics result in low economic growth, 
high inflation rate and reduce the efficiency of 
funded pension plans. In addition, risks of inad-
equate regulation of insurance and pension mar-
kets emerge. All risks are born individually, and 
overall picture of the pension system is appropri-
ate. Thus, on the basis of current pension reforms, 
we will analyze the way of pension entitlements 
accumulation and risk allocation among the sys-
tem stakeholders. 
Methodology and research data 
Based on the World Bank 1 universal classifica-
tion of pension pillars, the authors conducted the 
comparative analysis of pension reforms in Russia, 
the UK, Germany, Italy and Poland, and presented 
the results. According to the goal of the article, the 
authors had formulated the hypotheses: pension 
system-reforming process regardless of the initial 
starting point, and the type of the reform leads to 
the similar trajectories of the pension system de-
1 The World Bank classification is based on multi-pillared ap-
proach. A zero pillar is to all of the elderly. It is non-contrib-
utory and financed from the tax revenues; a mandatory earn-
ings-relating first pillar with the objective to replace a part of 
the lost income. Second pillar is a mandatory funded pension 
based on accumulated both by employers and employees funds 
in the accounts of autonomous (non-state) pension funds or in-
surance companies; a funded voluntary third pillar and a fourth 
pillar — voluntary informal family support.
velopment. Historically, the diverse pension sys-
tems and different starting points stipulate the 
choice of countries for analysis. The research di-
rection is worker’s pension entitlements accumu-
lation and the old age risk management. The dis-
tinctive feature of the approach is its focus on the 
proposed results of pension entitlements accumu-
lation and redistribution of pension plan risks be-
tween the government, an employer and an em-
ployee, rather than on quantitative analysis and 
restructure of the administration of revenues. 
Empirical results
The pension system in the Great Britain con-
sisted of three main pillars (table 1): The Basic 
State Pension Pillar, The State Earnings Related 
Pension Pillar and Corporate Pension Pillar 2. 
However, an outdated design failed to meet to-
day’s economic realities.
Started in 2015, the pension reform will funda-
mentally change pension system in the UK. On the 
lower pillars, there are risks of fiscal sustainability 
of the system (borne by the state and an employer, 
they have partly shifted to an employee). Risks of 
funded DC plans have been fully borne by an indi-
vidual. The system has been transformed into an 
equivalent type.
The essence of the new policy is a consolida-
tion of citizens’ retirement accounts into a new 
united structure, i.e. syndicated pension funds for 
workers. The collective form of pension plans will 
supplement the private funded pension schemes. 
Concurrently, limits to tax-free salary will increase 
up to £15,000 per year. The new program is close 
to the equivalent type of the pension rights accu-
mulation. There are several variants of disposal of 
individually accumulated pension pot: a retiree 
can withdraw 25 % of accumulated amount tax-
free. If the amount of the pension pot is less than 
£18,000, the rest 3/4 parts (after the withdrawal) 
could be got after reduced income tax, more, the 
income tax rate will be 55 %. One more way is an 
insurance market mechanism: it is possible to buy 
an annuity (the right for a lifetime income). The 
amount of annuity will make up a certain percent-
age of the pension pot. The third variant is an in-
vestment income on an accumulated fund (not the 
percentage of the amount). This variant is possi-
ble in case of a large amount of accumulated funds 
and when the investment income is more than an-
nuity amount 3.
2 Finance Act (FA) 2004. Part 4. Retrieved from: https://www.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/385065/TIIN_8130_2140.pdf (date of access 26.06.2015).
3 Retrieved from: https://www.gov.uk/plan-retirement-income/
private-pensions (date of access: 22.06.2015).
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The state motivates citizens to choose an ap-
propriate variant for the pension pot disposal in-
dependently. However, there are hidden risks of 
poor decision-making, which could sufficiently 
lessen income during the retirement period of an 
individual 1. To mitigate this risk, the Government 
of the UK promises a free expert advice in select-
ing the options of the pension pot disposal. The 
next task is to create the new state pension sys-
tem for the least well-off retirees through the in-
dependent decision-making. The state limits a po-
tential number of recipients with the abolition of 
the Second State Pension (S2P) and correspond-
ingly the prolongation of the period of contribu-
tions to the system for five years; additionally, the 
Single Pension Scheme based on the redistribu-
tion of incomes through inter-generation solidar-
ity is introduced. An extra incentive to enlarge ac-
cumulated funds will be tax repeal on the transfer 
of private pension savings to the heirs. However, 
there could be tax evasion schemes, drop in an-
nuities sales and the implementation of the long 
life risk. As for the last one, the Government plans 
to compensate it by the informal family support. 
The UK Government pays special attention to the 
1 Government Finance Statistics. Retrieved from: http://epp.eu-
rostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/government_finance_
statistics/documents/PL-Ex-ante_consultation-Subaccounts.
pdf (date of access: 26.06.2015).
pension insurance products that are provided by 
autonomous pension funds, as there is a way to 
access well-diversified UK insurance and reinsur-
ance markets. 
Pension reform in Germany. Three pillars pen-
sion insurance system in Germany was estab-
lished mostly on the pay-as-you-go principle. The 
state pension schemes prevailed while funded 
plans were of secondary importance. Therefore, 
the German Government made the main empha-
sis on the pay-as-you-go pillar reforming towards 
more flexibility, considering employment history 
and contributions made to the system. All men-
tioned above should change the proportion be-
tween structural parts of pension benefits. This 
scenario is of the second type. 
Pension reform of “The Grand Coalition” en-
tered into force on June 2014. 2. It is laid on four 
principles: early retirement on a full pension at 
the age of 63, maternity pension, partial disability 
pension and rehabilitation budget (der Bemessung 
des Rehabilitationsbudgets) (table 2).
The key emphasis of the coalition reform is 
made on the duration of a contribution period 
with the simultaneous reduction of preferences (a 
2 Entwurf eines Gesetzes über Leistungsverbesserungen 
in der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung (RV-Leistung 
sverbesserungsgesetz). Retrieved from: http://dip21.bundestag.
de/dip21/btd/18/015/1801507.pdf (date of access: 26.06.2015).
Table 1
The pension reform in the United Kingdom
The Pillars of Pension 
Provision Pre-Reforming Structure Post-Reforming Structure
0-pillar (social 
pensions)
A. Minimal Income Guarantee (supporting type, 
means tested). 
B. Pension Credit (DB — Defined Benefit, budget 
financing, means tested).
С. Basic State Pension (DB — Defined Benefit, 
supporting type, administratively established size) 
B. Pension Credit (DB — Defined Benefit). 
For people on a low income
1-st pillar 
(pay-as-you-go)
SERPS (State Earnings Related Pensions), DB 
(Defined Benefit, inter-generation risk distribution 
(until 2002) 
Single Pension Scheme, based on 
redistribution of individuals’ income, inter-
generation solidarity (New State Pension if 
a person reaches State Pension age after 6 
April 2016)
S2P (The State Second Pension), replaced SERP 
(DB — Defined Benefit, the risk distribution 
amongst generations and employees’ types
2-nd и 3-d pillars 
(funded)
Corporate pension plans (DB — Defined Benefit 
(risks borne by an employer)
Corporate pension plans (actuarial basis, 
DC (Defined Contribution), risks borne by 
an employee)
Supplementary, private voluntary funded 
plans (actuarially based, risks borne by an 
individual, a pension pot based on how 
much is paid in); from 2018 will become 
mandatory
4-th pillar Informal family support  Informal family support  as an extra source of  elderly age income 
Composed by the authors.
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higher education period is excluded from the con-
tribution period, although in 1991, it was 13 years). 
Early retirement is allowed in case of the working 
period record of 45 years without claiming unem-
ployed benefits for more than a short time.
The next phase of the reform is increasing con-
tributions to Pension Fund and reducing the re-
placement rate for the lost earnings. Contributions 
will smoothly rise from 18.9 % up to 22 % of salary, 
the average pension size will have been counted 
only 43.7 % of the lost earnings in 2030 (today the 
average replacement rate is 49.6 %, it was 52.9 % 
in 2000). We should note that this scenario is pos-
sible only under relatively stable economic condi-
tions and a low unemployment rate.
Developed economies, including Germany, are 
characterized by the outrunning growth of popu-
lation aged over 80 years; an individual faces the 
risk of long life. As the OECD estimates, by 2050, 
the old-aged population will have tripled. The 
German dependency ratio will have been among 
the highest in the world. Therefore, it is essen-
tial to encourage people to enter funded pension 
plans founded on actuarial principles as well as to 
rely on the informal family support 1. Each of these 
sources contributes to the result. 
Thus, there will be a significant expansion of 
the pension provision pillars in the nearest years, 
the reduction of the state pensions amount re-
gardless of the level of earnings, the shift to funded 
pension plans, and wider old age risk transfer into 
an individual.
1 Pension Markets in Focus. OECD. 2014. Issue 7. Retrieved 
from: www.oecd.org/daf/pensions/pensionmarkets (date of ac-
cess: 26.06.2015).
Pension reform in Italy. The Italian pension sys-
tem as Germanys is mostly grounded on a pay-as-
you-go basis. According to estimations, the pro-
portion of the state pension payments was about 
70 % of the total amount of the pension received 
by an employee. The major source of private pen-
sions is autonomous pension funds and insurance 
companies, which correspondingly provide about 
30 % and 18 % 2.
“The Fornero pension reform” in Italy came 
into force in 2012 (DL 201/2011 — Decreto-Legge 
6 dicembre 2011, № 201), 3 assuming the transition 
to the NDC system (the second type of the reform). 
The first component of the reform is gradual in-
creasing of the statutory retirement age by estab-
lishing a minimum contribution period of 20 years 
and the eliminating gender gap age by equalizing 
the retirement age for men and women. By 2018, 
the statutory retirement age in Italy will have been 
66 years and six months for both genders.
The second component is that early retire-
ment will replace the elderly age state pen-
sion (Pensionе Sociale). Employment history for 
early retirement must be at least 41 years and six 
months for women and 42 years and six months 
for men (in 2014–2015). The third component is 
an annual periodical recalculation of retirement 
age depending on an increase in average lifespan 
(table 3).
2 Pension Markets in Focus. OECD. 2014. Issue 7. Retrieved 
from: www.oecd.org/daf/pensions/pensionmarkets (date of ac-
cess: 26.06.2015).
3 Factbox: The Fornero pension reform law. Retrieved from: 
http://www.ansa.it/english/news/politics/2015/01/20/factbox-
the-fornero-pension-reform-law_41db6dc8–72e8–4b27-a011–
2dae8da54403.html (date of access: 26.06.2015).
Table 2
The current pension reform in Germany
Pillars of Pension Provision PreReforming Structure Post-Reforming Structure
0-pillar (social pensions) Social allowances (budget financing) Social allowances (budget financing) Mandatory elderly age pension 
1-st pillar (pay-as-you-go)
Mandatory elderly age pension (DC — 
Defined Contribution, risks are shared 
between a worker, an employer, and the 
state; calculation in pension points)
Early retirement on the full pension at 63 (for 
those born on or before 1953)
Maternity pension
Disability pension
(DC — Defined Contribution, risks are shared 
between a worker, an employer, and the state; 
calculation in pension points)
2-nd и 3-d pillars (funded)
Corporate pension plans (DB — Defined 
Benefit (risks borne by an employer))
Corporate pension plans (DB — Defined 
Benefit (risks borne by an employer))
Private voluntary plans actuarial basis, 
risks borne by an employee 
Private voluntary plans actuarial basis, risks 
borne by an employee
4-th pillar Informal family support Informal family support as an extra source of elderly age income 
Composed by the authors.
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The Italian pension system has become closer 
to the liberal model, typical for Britain. There have 
been fines for early retirees recently: 2 % each year 
until reaching the age of 60 and 1 % — after 60. For 
2015–2017, early retirement fines were canceled. 
This element is similar to the German pension re-
form: an early retirement, a subject to the pay-
ment of contributions to the Pension Fund no less 
than 20 years 1. 
As the authors suggest, the NDC pension re-
form path is rather a good compromise for Italy 
between Defined Contribution and Defined 
Benefit pension schemes. Risks of adequate fi-
nancing of the system are fully borne by a future 
retiree. Unfunded schemes, on the contrary, trans-
fer risks to the state. From the view point of a fi-
nancing mechanism, unfunded schemes (pay-as-
you-go) are determined by demographic, macro-
economic and other parameters. The compromise 
allows distributing risks for a wide range of partic-
1 The consultative site devoted to the social insurance and pen-
sion reform in Italy. Retrieved from: www.inps.it (date of ac-
cess: 26.06.2015).
ipants and, as a result, reducing the risk for an in-
dividual. However, individually borne risks are still 
the ones of low wages, employment breaks or early 
retirement. Since the calculation of payments is 
based on the previous employee’s contribution to 
the system (not based on available resources in 
the system at the time of retirement), there is a 
probability of funding gap risk, which will be elim-
inated at the expense of working population. 
Pension reform in Poland. Central and Eastern 
Europe and the post-Soviet countries have faced 
the problem of the transition from the centralized 
social provision to the social insurance system. 
Eastern Europe is an illustration of the funded 
pension system failure. Unlike Russia, where pen-
sion savings are “frozen”, in several countries of 
Eastern Europe accumulated savings were nation-
alized and spent by the Government.
A large number of financial institutions — 
pension funds and insurance companies — had 
emerged during the post-Soviet transition and pri-
vatization of the state property in Poland. After in-
surance and pension markets formation had been 
completed, a rapid consolidation started. New for-
Table 3
The scheme of Pension Reform in Italy
Pillars of Pension Provision Pre-Reforming Structure PostReforming Structure
0-pillar (social pensions) Not provided Assegno Sociale (social allowance) — means tested, risks borne by the state 
1-st pillar (pay-as-you-go) Pensionе Sociale (social pension) — minimum elderly age pension Not provided
2-nd и 3-d pillars (funded)
Social insurance system Sistema 
Retributivo (earning related 
methodology) — basis: average 
salary)
NDC (Notion-Defined System) 
Metodo Contributivo (contribution based 
methodology — actuarial basis, risks are divided 
among an employer and an employee  
Voluntary system, autonomous pension funds, 
(actuarial basis, risks borne by an employee)
4-th pillar Informal family support Informal family support as an extra source of elderly age income
Composed by the authors.
Table 4
Pension reform in Poland
Pillars of Pension Provision Pr- Reform Structure Post-Reform Structure 
1-st pillar
The minimal pension 
provision
Mandatory elderly age pension 
(DC — Defined Contribution) 
risks borne by employees 
according to a type of 
employment
0-ties — guaranteed minimum pension (means 
tested, a supported type, risks born by the state)
1-st pillar — mandatory pension (DC — Defined 
Contribution, inter-generation risk distribution, 
earning and employment period related) 
2-nd pillar social insurance 
Pension programs (DB — 
Defined Benefit (inter-generation 
solidarity)
2-nd pillar — mandatory funded (DC — Defined 
Contribution (actuarial basis, risks borne by an 
employee)
3-rd pillar — Voluntary private pension programs 
(actuarial basis, risks borne by an employee)
Composed by the authors.
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eign financial institutions came to the market that 
changed radically the balance of power in the fi-
nancial industry [13].
The pension reform in Poland had already 
started in 1999 during the country’s transition to 
the market economy. Future pension benefits be-
came dependent on the amount of individual con-
tributions made during the employment period 
(table 4). 
The prevailing idea of the reform was the the-
sis about the need to diversify the sources of pen-
sion contributions, which included two manda-
tory and one voluntary pillar. Mandatory pillar 
constituted 19.52 % of the payroll. On the first 
stage, funds were transferred to the accounts of 
the State Social Insurance Fund (ZUS — Zakład 
Ubezpieczeń Społecznych), and then 7.3 % of the 
overall amount were transferred to autonomous 
pension funds. The citizens were to choose the 
pension fund, which invested into an accumula-
tive part of the future pension. The third pillar is 
voluntary individual retirement accounts. The to-
tal amount of accumulated funds was the larg-
est among the East European countries — about 
70 billion euros of assets with more than 16 mil-
lion participants. However, at the end of 2013, the 
Government nationalized 51.5 % of the non-state 
pension funds assets 1. Funds were transmitted to 
The State Pension Fund from mandatory funded 
pillar to the unfunded pillar with annual index-
ing on nominal GDP growth rate 2. Elderly partici-
pants (10 or fewer years before the pension) were 
required to transfer their savings from non-state 
funds to The State Pension Fund, and the others 
were obligated to make a choice either to stay in 
the mandatory system or to select a combination 
of both. In addition to the narrowing of the cu-
mulative component, the government proposed 
a gradual increase in the retirement age up to 67 
years (from 60 for females and 65 for males). This 
reflects the Poland’s path to the harmonization 
with the European countries on the issue of gen-
der equality. However, the new statutory retire-
ment age escalated social tensions in the country 
and did not lead to the set objectives.
Following the running out of the withdrawn 
pillar money, there will be an inevitable extra bur-




7b9e1a (date of access: 28.06.2015).
2 Government Finance Statistics. Retrieved from: http://epp.eu-
rostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/government_finance_
statistics/documents/PL-Ex-ante_consultation-Subaccounts.
pdf (date of access: 26.06.2015).
den on the working population and further ques-
tions about the necessity of funded pillar refusal. 
For instance, with the similar scenario, the Czech 
Republic has already faced the problem of raising 
payroll taxes to finance the state social provision 
system. The inertia of the economy and pension 
systems does not allow fully assessing the conse-
quences of any failure of the funded component 3. 
Tactically, the government decision to use accu-
mulated funds (about 50 billion Euros) to cover 
the budget deficit and to solve urgent tasks was 
correct. Before the withdrawal, the budget deficit 
amounted to 5 %. In 2014, the budget surplus was 
about 4.5 % 4. However, strategic thinking shows 
future defeat: the country will lose a vast source 
of cheap domestic investments, and citizens — the 
chance to increase their well-being in elderly age.
Pension reform in Russia. For a proper and deep 
analysis of the Russian retirement system we 
should point out general problems determined the 
whole series of ongoing reforms. Firstly, a funda-
mental challenge of the Russian retirement sys-
tem is the long-term budget deficit of The State 
Pension Fund (PFR) (figture 1). It influences the 
financial stability of the state pension commit-
ments and requires an increased share of GDP to 
cover the deficit. If, in the medium-term period 
between 2020 and 2030 it will have amounted just 
over 5 %, in the long-term, the expected share of 
GDP will have exceeded 20 %. The short-term defi-
cit reduction of the PFR in the period from 2020 to 
2030 has been determined by a new phase of pen-
sion reform, started in 2014.
Secondly, another square circle is the demo-
graphic characteristics of Russia. According to the 
decline rate of the working-age population (about 
1 % per year), Russia will have been among top 
ten countries in the world in the next 15 years. 
However, Russian aging is less deep and, unlike 
the European one, tends to increase the number 
of “young” retirees. Even by 2050 under the UN es-
timations of the proportion of the Russians aged 
over 80 years will have been only 6 % of the to-
tal population. Thirdly, an acute problem in the 
Russian pension system is poor financial literacy 
of the population and a lack of trust in long-term 
financial projects. That is the repercussion of the 
3 The electronic version of bulletin “The Population and Society”. 
Institute of Demography — National Research University 
Higher School of Economics. Retrieved from: http://www.dem-
oscope.ru/weekly/2014/0623/gazeta021.php (date of access: 
26.06.2015).
4 Government Finance Statistics. Retrieved from: http://epp.eu-
rostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/government_finance_
statistics (date of access: 26.06.2015).
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negative experience of 20-year transition period 
[14].
Old age poverty is also a topical problem in 
Russia. The minimum replacement rate adopted 
in the world practice is 40 % of the previous in-
come. The same is for Russia. The national aver-
age replacement rate is 47 %; however, it reaches 
70 % in some regions. We can see the Russian 
specificity here: in the regions with the maxi-
mum replacement rate, the average salary barely 
exceeds the minimum subsistence level. In 2013, 
in the Ivanovo region, it was 16 200 rubles, in the 
Kostroma, Bryansk, Kursk regions — just above 
17 000 rubles. The minimum average wage was 
recorded in the Orlov region, and it amounted 
to 13 300 rubles, maximum — in Chukotka 
Autonomous District and Moscow (50 400 ru-
bles). Indeed, the Orlov region replacement rate 
reached almost 78 % (the national average pen-
sion benefit constituted 10 400 rubles in 2014), 
and in Moscow was only 21 %. Such regional dis-
parities are typical for Russia; therefore, it is un-
acceptable to use average indicators in our coun-
try. The authors suggest a unified criterion of 
pension benefits amount. It should be elaborated 
by the expert community taking into account the 
specifics of the regional development in Russia.
The solution for the old age poverty problem 
in Russia could be found in the long-term per-
spective with the individualization of the funded 
part of pension contributions. Russia also should 
use the accumulated international experience 
of reforms with consideration to its specificity: 
the statutory retirement age rise (the use of the 
phrase “encouraging later retirement” is more so-
cially approved) as well as encourage the develop-
ment of voluntary pension plans and pension in-
surance. All the above-mentioned solutions to the 
problems of the pension system will economically 
affect only in the medium and long-term. It is nec-
essary to analyze risk factors and drivers of pen-
sion system financial sustainability in the nearest 
future.
Informal labour market. Hidden remuneration 
schemes are a risk factor for The State Pension 
Fund revenues and replacement rate decrease 
during the retirement period. It is possible to de-
termine the scale of the informal labor market and 
the size of the shadow financial flows only on the 
indirect data. But the a non-observed economy 
is a huge reserve for the effective development 
of countries with economies in transition [15]. It 
could be used by improving the democratic foun-
dations and the institutional framework of the 
market economy. Despite significant growth in 
monetary terms, the share of hidden remunera-
tion has not practically changed since the period 
from 2000 to 2010, and it is more than 50 % of the 
payroll that stands for stable and mature informal 
sector in the RF economy. The estimated lost con-
tributions in 2013 were more than 1.4 trillion ru-
bles. That is especially important, as the budget 
deficit in 2013 was 1.99 trillion rubles. 
The widespread of informal employment along 
with low wages is usually seen as a temporary re-
sult of the economic transformation. However, the 
experience of Western countries that entered the 
path of post-industrial development earlier sug-
gests that the increasing diversity of employment 
types and changing employment behavior are in-
separable companions of the progress.
Pension systems are under profound im-
pact today; as they were organized to cover risks 
of old age for industrial workers, with employ-
Fig. 1. The estimated PFR budget deficit for the period up to 2050 (compiled by: the FL dated 03.12.2012 # 218-FL “On the Budget 
of the Russian Federation Pension Fund of 2013 as well as the planned period of 2014–2015 years”; the forecast of the Ministry of 
the Russian Federation Economic Development, dated 13.04.2012)
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ment throughout the life under conditions of full 
employment 1.
The research on forms of informal employment 
conducted by the group of the authors [16] proves 
that risks are inversely proportional to a size of an 
enterprise and in the service sector, and construc-
tion business is higher than in industrial enter-
prises. Similar results [17] are given by the study of 
informal employment that is common for self-em-
ployed individuals in small businesses.
Consequently, decreasing figures of employ-
ees on large- and medium-sized enterprises and 
growth of employment in the informal sector can 
be seen as processes that reduce the number of 
potential payers of pension contributions. It is 
important to realize that the most reliable infor-
mation on wages is also collected primarily from 
large and medium-sized enterprises, and their 
share has been steadily declining. Based on the 
provided information, the average wage and the 
replacement rate (the ratio of the average pension 
to the average wage) are calculated. 
State employee transfers. In 2011, the num-
ber of the state employees in Russia amounted to 
1.114 million workers. The average salary of of-
ficials was more than the third (35.6 %) higher 
than the average salary in Russia. According to 
the State Statistics Committee, in 2014, 4 million 
people served in Russian law enforcement agen-
cies: 1.32 million people were police officers, 2.02 
million people worked in the Ministry of Defense, 
325.5 thousand people — in the Federal Service 
for Execution of Punishment, 40 thousand peo-
ple — in the Federal Drug Control Service. The au-
thors suggest that there are reasons to consider 
the extension of the pension insurance system 
to all categories of employed persons (civil serv-
ants, military and law enforcement officials in the 
relevant law enforcement agencies, on the anal-
ogy with the civil officers, who are subject to ob-
ligatory pension insurance). The beneficial aspect 
is that the average age of civil servants is 39–40 
years. Pension contributions will be paid from now 
on. However, the payout period will come only in 
20–25 years. The inclusion of state servants in the 
system of pension insurance will enable to reduce 
the risks of imbalances significantly in the budget 
of the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation. 
The advantage is also the fact that there is infor-
mal employment among state servants.
Low financial literacy of the population. The 
USSR system did not require the enrollment of a 
1 The Unified Inter-department Federal Statistic Service. 
“Hidden labor payment and mixed incomes”. Retrieved from: 
http://fedstat.ru/indicator/description.do?id=33977 (dae of ac-
cess: 20.03.2015).
citizen in the process of the future pension for-
mation. There are the following problems faced 
by the state owing to the remnants of the former 
USSR system:
1) the lack of the habit to make decisions upon 
personal risks; 
2) incredulity to the financial market; 
3) underdeveloped financial markets and the 
lack of capital; 
4) the comparative advantages of the former 
monopoly over newly created competitors; 
5) the absence of the historical data about 
losses of non-state pension funds and informa-
tion about companies; 
6) the lack of supervision and market 
regulation; 
7) the lack of infrastructure.
The negative experience of financial pyra-
mids, transition to the market economy, devalua-
tion of the national currency, loss of savings, and 
etc. worsen the situation. For decreasing The State 
Pension Fund deficit, it is necessary to create in-
centives for the population to participate in vol-
untary pension schemes of autonomous pension 
funds and insurance companies. The latter should 
have an access to conduct operations in the man-
datory pension system.
The necessity for regulation and supervision 
consistency. Since the pension system trans-
formation was launched in 2002, the current re-
form has been the third one. That causes reason-
able concerns for future retirees as the manda-
tory pension insurance requires the contributions 
of the economically active part of the population 
throughout their employment period. The created 
three pillars pension system combined the man-
datory participation in the pay-as-you go system 
(1st pillar), the mandatory funded 2nd pillar and 
voluntary pension savings (3rd pillar). Recently, it 
has been again under the revision and transforma-
tion (table 5).
After the next phase of the pension reform, the 
emphasis of the regulator has changed: the cumu-
lative element is out of attention, vulnerable to 
criticism. The government intends to exclude the 
funded system out of the obligatory pension in-
surance. The existing accumulated funds are “fro-
zen” until the end of 2015 and transferred to the 
unfunded system to repay The Pension Fund defi-
cit. This means that the priority for the regulator 
(as in the countries with transitional economies) 
is to solve short-term problems of the RF pen-
sion system. Moreover, the complex mechanism 
of pension calculation has become more compli-
cated: instead of the usual cash form, it is based 
now on pension points. Pension entitlements are 
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formed on the tunnel type (maximum annual in-
come is stipulated for calculation of contribu-
tions) with equivalent type elements on the 3rd 
pillar. The purposes of the reform are to increase 
the value of the insured employment period for 
the employee and to individualize personal con-
tribution to the system. The overall direction of 
the reform coincides with the reform direction in 
the developed countries and implies a significant 
transfer of old age risk management into the indi-
vidual level. However, the primary task is to bal-
ance the pension system by encouraging an exten-
sion of the employment period after statutory re-
tirement age by transferring major scoring on that 
period without application for pension benefits. 
For every extra year of employment, both the fixed 
and insurance part of pension will increase by the 
corresponding coefficients. This way the regulator 
postpones the fulfillment of obligations to the re-
tiree and reduces the expected period of payment.
Conclusions and recommendations
A pension reform is always a part of structural 
changes in economic and social policies of a state. 
Its main purpose is to create the multi-pillar pen-
sion system that provides citizens with the oppor-
tunity to have a decent pension after retirement. 
In the comparative analysis of pension reforms 
scenarios in the UK, Germany, Italy, Poland, and 
Russia we have identified several general trends:
1. The reduction of importance for basic un-
funded pension pillar in favor of higher pillars and 
increasing the statutory retirement age. Thus, the 
state separates functions of poverty protection in 
elderly age and the replacement of the lost income 
and their redistribution to different pillars of the 
pension provision.
2. Pension entitlements modernization takes 
place in the following directions: 
— the poverty prevention acquires the features 
of the social provision, as the right to get these 
types of pensions is means tested and budget 
funding (the source is tax revenues). Risks are en-
tirely borne by the state, and the redistribution 
of incomes occurs through the principle of in-
ter-generations solidarity;
— the replacement of the lost income based on 
an individual contribution and the lifetime expec-
tancy of a retiree points out the actuarial compo-
nent in the calculation of future benefits. In turn, 
the principle of generations solidarity loses its 
value;
— the increasing role of funded financing, 
which may be implemented in various forms, from 
the creation and investment of insurance reserves 
under the state system to the complete privatiza-
tion of the pension system.
3. The common features of the analyzed re-
forms are the transfer of the old age risk and long 
life risk management from the state to the indi-
vidual level. 
4. The Russian pension system modification 
runs in parallel both with the developed and the 
Central and Eastern European countries, which in 
the early 2000s moved from centralized to mar-
ket-oriented mechanisms.
Table 5
Pension Reform in Russia
Pillars of Pension 
Provision Pre-Reform Structure Post 2002–2006 Reform Structure Post 2015 Reform Structure 
0-pillar (social 
pensions) Not provided
Elderly age pension (independent 
of the employment period, indexed, 
appointed in 5 years after statutory 
pension age)
Fixed payment independent 




Elderly age pension (pay-
as-you-go), personal 
pensions (personal merits) 
Obligatory labor pension (fixed basic 
amount of an insurance part + labor 
pension) (pay-as-you-go, earning 
and employment period related, 
indexed, risks borne by the state) 
Elderly age insurance pension 
( pay-as-you-go, earning and 
employment period related, 
indexed, risks borne by the 
state)*
2-nd (funded) Not provided
Obligatory funded pension 
(mandatory choice between the state 
and non-state pension funds)
Voluntary funded pension 
(reduces an insurance part 
of pension) risks borne by an 
employee 
3-rd (funded) Not provided Voluntary pension plans (actuarial basis, risks borne by an employee) 
Voluntary pension plans 
(actuarial basis, risks borne by 
an employee)
Composed by the authors.
* Minimum contribution period is 15 years and 30 points.
168 социальНо-демографический потеНциал региоНальНого развития
ЭКОНОМИКА РЕГИОНА № 4 (2015)  www.economyofregion.com
The above mentioned allows us to consider our 
hypothesis confirmed.
5. While defining the future direction of the 
Russian pension system reform, it is necessary to 
pay attention to both the positive and negative 
consequences of certain decisions:
— there are several affordable options for the 
UK retirees to choose from. It does not just per-
sonify the contribution of each retiree to the over-
all pension pot, but arises a feeling of personal 
involvement and could become a motivating el-
ement for additional contributions to voluntary 
pension programs. This experience is rather rel-
evant for Russia, because of a high share of infor-
mal remuneration and informal employment;
— the opportunity to choose a variant of dis-
posal for the individually accumulated pension 
pot requires a high level of financial literacy and 
responsibility for the elderly age period. They 
have not been sufficiently developed in our coun-
try yet;
— the German experience could be useful for 
reasonable flexibility of the system, considera-
tions of individual contributions and employment 
history concurrently with a great share of an un-
funded component; 
— the possibility of early retirement with a 
long-term employment history is provided in 
Germany and Italy, which is also relevant for 
Russia;
— another positive experience would be the 
implementation of theNDC component (Italy’s 
experience) in Russia, allowing to disperse risks 
for a wide range of people in the community and 
reduce an individual risk accordingly;
— the nationalization of accumulated funds 
had not solved the main problems of the Poland’s 
pension system. However, it was one more “stain” 
on the reputation of the regulator. At the same 
time, the Russian government decided to extend 
the moratorium on the funded component for 
2016.
The pension provision in Russia is grounded 
on an extensive legislative framework, currently. 
There is a large number of federal normative legal 
acts, regulating the sources for the pension pro-
vision, principles and methods of accumulation, 
saving and distribution of available resources. 
There is also a continuous improvement of the 
legislation. Therefore, the comparative analysis of 
pension reforms being simultaneously regarded 
with the Russian one (both for advanced econo-
mies with a long history of pension markets and 
countries with transitional economies) is very im-
portant for the further development of the pen-
sion system and encouraging the participation of 
the population.
The results could be useful in further analy-
sis for the purpose of pension regulation improve-
ment, because a high level of pension benefits in-
creases the adequacy of the system, but reduces 
its sustainability. At the same time, the increase 
in the retirement age or its economic equivalent 
— encouraging later retirement during the growth 
of life expectancy — has a positive effect on its 
stability.
In addition, the results of the study could be 
useful for the insurance industry: both for insur-
ers and regulatory agencies. The conclusions will 
add extra information to optimal strategic deci-
sion-making and a choice of the optimal way of 
the development considering external challenges. 
They help to offer new long-term pension insur-
ance products with an investment component that 
will undoubtedly diversify the risk of pension in-
vestments by dividing them between the state, 
pension and insurance market.
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